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Abstract
This paper presents an overlapping generations growth model with heterogeneous
labour, endogenous unemployment, and public sector corruption. Unlike most previ-
ous studies, the model does not separate public o¢ cials and private individuals into
two distinct groups. Instead, taking up bureaucratic appointment as a public servant
is modelled as an occupational choice, which then allows for the endogenous determi-
nation of the proportion of public o¢ cials, the share of corrupt o¢ cials among them,
and the public investment e¢ ciency of the economy within the dynamic system. Pa-
rameterised for Nigeria, the dynamics of endogenous corruption and unemployment,
as well as their policy tradeo¤, are studied using numerical policy experiments based
on relevant themes in the country, which include public sector downsizing and social
intervention schemes.
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1 Introduction
In most developing economies, notably low and lowermiddle income economies
with poor institutional and governance quality, public o¢ cials, often well-
educated groups of elites, are in unique positions to abuse their powers in the
various forms of corruption. Public sector corruption, broadly dened as the
illegal or unauthorised proteering by public o¢ cials abusing their authori-
tative positions, can manifest in di¤erent forms including embezzlement of
public funds, fraud claims, and direct receipts of bribery and o¤ers substan-
tial personal gains at the costs of society, hence potentially causing signicant
damage to socio- and economic development (Blackburn et al., 2011).
In the literature of public sector corruption, the contributions made in
the form of microeconomic and applied empirical studies over the last decade
have been enormous1, with development economists now having a general con-
sensus on the bads of corruption and its long-term adverse impact of growth
and development. Indeed, corruption activities often transcend direct prac-
ticing of fraud and bribery, and in some instances lead to the creation of
bureaucratic leviathan or red tapes, especially when there are principal-agent
considerations in the duties of public o¢ cials (Banerjee, 1997; Guriev, 2004;
Fredriksson, 2014). As such, corruption can be persistent over time, hence ad-
versely a¤ecting for instance, private investment (Mauro, 1997), human capital
accumulation (Ehrlich and Liu, 1999), rmsgrowth (Fisman and Svensson,
2007), and inequality (Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio, 2007) over the long-
run. These are supported by ndings in the vast empirical literature, where
evidence shows that most developing countries with poor institutions and high
1Examples of microeconomic models with public sector rent-seeking and corruption in-
clude, non-exhaustively, Cule and Fulton (2005), Infante and Smirnova (2009), Dugrov
(2010), Ryvkin and Serra (2012), Fredriksson (2014), and relevant references therein. These
studies examine corruption manifesting in di¤erent forms, but not their implications to
economic growth in a general equilibrium, macroeconomic context.
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levels of corruption have experienced poor growth performance. For instance,
Mauro (1997) documents evidence that corruption tends to lead to a diver-
sion of public expenditure from growth-promoting areas such as education
and healthcare to large-scale infrastructure investment projects. Moreover,
the adverse e¤ects of corruption on growth are shown by Aidt et al. (2008)
and Méndez and Sepúlveda (2006) to be both nonlinear and non-monotonic,
with the latter documenting the existence of non-zero level of corruption in a
growth-maximising situation.
In spite of the growing research interests on corruption and growth, there
remains some relatively underexplored areas. One such aspect that have plenty
of anecdotal evidence and often attract attention from development practition-
ers and low-income countriespolicymakers alike yet receive little attention
from the academic community is the corruption-unemployment nexus. As
argued by the World Bank (in its periodic updates on the regions) and in con-
tributions such as Ndikumana (2006) and Bakare (2011), both corruption and
unemployment are often two of the most pressing policy issues facing many
African developing economies. High levels of corruption in African countries
reduces the quality of public investment, discourages private physical and hu-
man capital investment, and consequently results in dampened growth, which
in turn perpetuates unemployment. Sustained unemployment then results in
economic instability and an increase in illegal activities (often in the forms of
black market), which then making it easier and cheaper for corruption prac-
tices. Indeed, faced with a weakened economy with large gaps in infrastructure,
a lack of skills, and poor public service delivery, the goals of ghting corrup-
tion and tackling unemployment are among the main policy priorities of the
new Buhari administration in Nigeria, one of the largest lower-middle income
economy in Sub-Saharan Africa.
While the corruption-unemployment nexus remains an underexplored area,
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more so in macroeconomic studies, we can easily conjecture a dynamic relation-
ship between the two by reviewing the existing literatures in these two areas.
In terms of macroeconomic contributions on corruption, the earlier study of
Sarte (2000) models corruption in the form of bureaucratic rent-seeking, where
the bureaucrats restrict rmsentry into the formal sector by creating articial
procedures as means to appropriate rmsprots. Subsequent contributions
with rent-seeking bureaucrats exploiting their access to asymmetric informa-
tion tend to come to a conclusion that corruption leads to adverse e¤ects on
the quality of public capital, discourage specialisation and therefore leading to
lower economic growth. These include Bose et al. (2008) and Chakraborty and
Dabla-Norris (2011). Given that the procurement process is said by the former
to account for nearly 70 percent of many central governments expenditure,
a popular modelling choice therefore involves specication of public o¢ cials
having asymmetric information on the quality and cost of inputs necessary
for public goods production, which then creates opportunities for o¢ cials to
embezzle public funds (Blackburn et al., 2011; Haque and Kneller, 2015).
In terms of studies focusing on structural unemployment and economic
growth, Bernal-Verdugo et al. (2012) argue that policies aimed at increas-
ing labour market exibility would reduce unemployment. For developing
economies with well-documented poor governance and public service deliver
issues, Agénor et al. (2007), in a computational general equilibrium study on
Middle East and North Africa, argue for the use of labour policies to not only
reduce unemployment but also to indirectly improve the governance e¤ective-
ness (given that public sector is often one of the largest employer in these
economies). Similar ndings are documented by Anand and Khera (2016),
who study the impact of labour market reforms on unemployment and infor-
mality in India. However, in the context of middle-income economies, Agénor
and Lim (2017) conclude their study by stating that ambitious labour market
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measures aimed at tackling long-term unemployment can be fruitless if there
were weak administrative capacity and poor governance, both of which are
hallmarks of economies with high incidence of corruption.
Empirically, to our knowledge, Bouzid (2016) is the only study that exam-
ines the nexus between corruption and unemployment albeit youth unemployment
in which he posits that corruption practices by public o¢ cials with hiring
power tend to increase the unemployment rate among youth and educated
workers, and this in turn results in more corruption when job-seekers have to
bribe the o¢ cials for job. Lackó (2004) indirectly examines this nexus between
corruption and unemployment, where a high labour tax combined with high
corruption level is found to contribute to an increase in unemployment. Never-
theless, these empirical exercises are neither anchored by microfoundations nor
general equilibrium framework. As such, what we do know about the nexus is
that, there appears to be non-direct but signicant relationship between cor-
ruption and unemployment. As implied in reports such as World Bank (2012),
the e¤ects of corruption on unemployment tends to be indirect, where the re-
duced public investment quality results in lower growth and income, which in
turn impedes job creation in the long-run. Nonetheless, the implementation
of e¤ective labour policies can facilite human capital development, improve
social cohesion, and consequently reduce the incentive for corruption.
To formally model the corruption-unemployment nexus, this paper presents
a dynamic ovelapping generations (OLG) growth model with endogenous un-
employment and public sector corruption. In terms of existing studies, Spinesis
(2009) model with heterogeneous abilities and endogenous human capital ac-
cumulation examines many of the issues that we are modelling. However, his
model is based on a Schumpeterian quality ladder framework without unem-
ployment and does not examine transitional dynamics. In contrast, we have
a di¤erent setup that allows for endogenous determination of both unemploy-
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ment and corruption, as well as the examination of transitional dynamics of
policies. Also, unlike with standard theoretical growth models of corruption,
we do not need to separate public o¢ cials and private individuals into two
distinct groups. Instead, taking up bureaucratic appointment as a public ser-
vants is modelled as an occupational choice albeit one that has specication
that ensures complete bureaucratic participation which then allows for the
proportion of public o¢ cials in the economy in each period, as well the shares
among those that are corrupt, to be endogenously determined. In my knowl-
edge, this is among the rst instances where the dynamics of endogenous cor-
ruption and unemployment are examined together in a model of endogenous
growth. As multilateral organisations alike have moved forward with designing
more concrete measurement of corruption, this allows us to provide a direct
theoretical counterpart where variables such as the share of corrupt o¢ cials
and public investment e¢ ciency can be directly parameterised and studied as
policy variables.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. Section 3 denes the balanced growth equilibrium and discusses its
properties. Model parameterisations are reported in Section 4 to reect the
initial state of a typical lower-middle income Sub-Saharan African economy
facing high rates of unemployment and corruption. Specically, the model is
parameterised for Nigeria, which is topical given that the new administration
is committed to ghting corruption. In Section 5, various policy experiments
are analysed and discussed. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Time is discrete with t = 0; 1; :::;1, and there is an overlapping generations
of households populated by two-periods lived individuals (adulthood and old
age) with di¤erent innate abilities. Population is constant at N . Each indi-
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vidual is risk neutral and endowed with one unit of time in each period of life.
In old age, time is allocated entirely to leisure. In the beginning of adulthood,
individuals decide whether to acquire skills or to directly enter into the work-
force as unskilled workers. The acquisition of skills is necessary if one were
to work as public o¢ cials, or skilled workers in the private sector (specically,
non-routine task in the design sector). Both the unskilled and skilled workers
can be unemployed, of which then they collect an unemployment benet/cash
transfer from an unemployment insurance fund nanced by rmspayroll con-
tribution and administered by the government. In addition, the government
also operates a general budget, where expenditure consists primarily of public
invesment and public emoluments. The latter consists of the wages paid to
the public o¢ cials employed to procure for public capital goods using funds
allocated from the former. Corruption arises from the incentive of an o¢ cial to
appropriate public funds by falsifying information to the government. Lastly,
the private production sectors consist of a nal good sector and a consolidated
intermediate goods and design sector. Unemployment prevails in the economy
due to labour market imperfection asociated with union bargaining of wages.
In terms of existing studies, the unemployment and private sector aspects
of the model are most similar to Agénor and Lim (2017), while the public sector
features the corruption due to uncertainty associated with procurement costs"
attributes introduced initially in Bose et al. (2008), and subsequently modied
by Blackburn et al. (2011) and Haque and Kneller (2015).
2.1 Individuals
Individuals have identical preferences but are born with di¤erent abilities, in-
dexed by a. Ability is instantly observable by all and follows a continuous
distribution with density function f(a) and cumulative distribution function
F (a), with support (0; 1). For tractability, a is assumed to be uniformly dis-
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tributed on its support. Each individual maximises utility and decides whether
to engage in market work as an unskilled worker or (after spending 1   % to
acquire skills) as a skilled worker. Specically, an adult with ability a can
enter the labour force at the beginning of period t as an unskilled worker and
earn the net wage (1   )wUt , which is independent of the workers ability.
Alternatively, the individual may choose to rst spend a fraction % 2 (0; 1) of
his/her time endowment at the beginning of adulthood in advanced training,
incur a cost tct > 0, and then enter the labour force for the remainder of the
period as a skilled worker, either working in the private sector as a design
worker, or in the public sector as a public o¢ cial. The former earns after-
tax wage of (1   )wSt , while the latter earns non-taxable wage, wSt . During
training, workers earn no income. All individuals can either be employed (su-
perscript E) or unemployed (superscript L). If unemployed, individuals earn
an unemployment benet/cash transfer from the government, bt, which is not
taxable.
Let ch;jtjt+n denote consumption at period t+n of an individual h = U; SY; SG,
either employed or unemployed, j = E;L, born at the beginning of period t,
with n = 0; 1. The individuals discounted utility function is given by
V h;jt = C ln c
h;j
tjt +
ln ch;jtjt+1
1 + 
; h = U; SY; SG; j = E;L (1)
where ; C > 0 are the common discount rate and preference parameter,
respectively.2
Generally, in the absence of corruption possibility, the period-specic bud-
get constraints are given by
cU;jtjt + s
Uj
t =

(1  )wUt
bt
if j = E
if j = L
; (2)
2Individuals do not derive disutility (utility) from working (leisure). The opportunity
cost of unemployment is simply the wage foregone.
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cS;jtjt + s
S;j
t =
8<:
(1  )[(1  %)wSt   tct]
(1  %)bt   tct
(1  %)wSt   tct
if h = SY; j = E
if j = L
if h = SG; j = E
(3)
ch;jtjt+1 = (1 + rt+1)s
h
t ; h = U; SY; SR; j = E;L (4)
where sh;jt is savings, 1 + rt+1 the gross rate of return between periods t and
t+ 1, and  2 (0; 1) the tax rate.
Note that the budget constraint specied above for a public o¢ cial applies
only to non-corrupt o¢ cials, since at the point when training decision would
have to be made, an individual does not factor into the possibility of a cor-
ruption opportunity arisen when he has been employed as a public o¢ cial. As
such, an individual nds it optimal to train if and only if his expected (after-
tax) earnings as a skilled worker, adjusted for the time and pecuniary costs of
training, exceeds the expected earnings of an unskilled worker:
(1 %)(SYt (1 )wSt +SGt wS+SLt bt) tct  (1 ULt )(1 )wUt +ULt bt; (5)
where the going wage, or the unemployment benet, is weighted by the re-
spective probability of being either employed or unemployed, ht 2 (0; 1), for
h = SY; SG; SL; UY; UL.3 In specifying (5), we assume for simplicity that an
individual knows if his/her ability is above or below the threshold aC and can
therefore decide whether to acquire skilled skills or not at the beginning of
adulthood.
The training cost is proportional to the expected skilled wage when em-
ployed and varies inversely with the individuals ability, which determines how
fast (or how well) he or she can learn:
tct = (1  %)(SYt (1  )wSt + SGt wSt )=a; (6)
with ;  2 (0; 1). The assumption on the productivity parameter  ensures
that the e¤ect of ability on training costs is subject to diminishing returns.
3Equation (5) is assumed to hold as a strict inequality for the individual with the highest
ability, that is, a = 1, otherwise nobody would choose to become skilled
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As shown in the Appendix, the threshold level of ability aCt such that all
individuals with ability higher than aCt choose to undergo training is given by
aCt = 
1=

1  (1  %) 1 (1  
UL
t )(1  )wUt + ULt bt   (1  %)SLt bt
SYt (1  )wSt + SGt wSt
 1=
:
(7)
The productivity of unskilled workers is constant regardless of ability and
is normalised to unity. Given (7), the raw supply of unskilled labour, NUt ,
is equal to the number of individuals in the population who choose not to
undergo training:
NUt = N
Z aCt
0
f(a)da = aCt N: (8)
The raw supply of skilled workers, at any time t, is N
R 1
aCt
f(a)da = (1  
aCt ) N . However, the average skill level of workers with ability a 2 (aCt ; 1) who
have undergone training equals (aCt + 1)=2; thus, the e¤ective supply of skilled
labour at time t, can be dened as
NSt =
1  (aCt )2
2
N: (9)
2.2 Final Good
The nal good production is characterised by routine task. Firm i, Y it , re-
quires the use of unskilled labour, NUYi;t , private capital, K
P
i;t, a combination
of intermediate inputs, xi;s;t, s 2 (0;Mt), and aggregate public capital, KGt .
The production function is specied as
Y it = [
KPt
N 
](NUYi;t )
U (KPi;t)
[
Z Mt
0
xi;s;tds]
=(KGt )
$; (10)
where U ; ;  2 (0; 1), ! > 0, U +  +  = 1,  2 (0; 1) and 1=(1   ) > 1
is (the absolute value of) the price elasticity of demand for each intermediate
good, and KPt is the aggregate private capital. Constant returns prevail with
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respect to private inputs, and production is subject to a standard Arrow-
Romer type of externality associated with the aggregate private capital stock,
though subject to congestion by the total population size at  > 0.
Assuming full depreciation, rm is prots are dened as
Yi;t = Y
i
t  
Z Mt
0
P st xi;s;tds  wUt NUYi;t   rtKPi;t: (11)
Each rm maximises prots subject to (11) with respect to labour, private
capital, and quantities of intermediate goods xi;s;t, 8s, taking factor prices and
Mt as given. This yields, in standard fashion,
wUt = 
U Yi;t
NUYi;t
; (12)
rt = (
Yi;t
KPi;t
): (13)
xi;s;t = (
Zi;t
P st
)1=(1 ); s = 1; :::Mt; (14)
Zi;t = Yi;t=
Z Mt
0
(xi;s;t)
ds: (15)
2.3 Intermediate Goods and Designs
A Romerian specication is used for the intermediate goods sector, where
monopolistically competitive market structure is assumed. To produce an
intermediate variety, a corresponding design has to be purchased from a coun-
terpart design rm. The design rms are the private sector employers of skilled
labour in this economy. There is only one producer of each input s, and each
of them must pay a fee to use the design. Production of each unit of an in-
termediate good uses a single unit of the nal good. Each intermediate good
producer sets a price to maximise prots, given the perceived demand func-
tion for its good. With a standard optimal price of P st =
1

: 8s = 1; :::Mt,
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the quantity demanded at this price is xs;t = (Zt)1=(1 ), 8s, which under
symmetry
RMt
0
xs;tds = Mtx

t , yields
xt = (
Yt
Mt
); (16)
with maximum prot of
It = (1  )(
Yt
Mt
): (17)
Following Agénor and Canuto (2015), intermediate rms are assumed to
last only one period, and that patents are auctioned o¤ randomly to a new
group of rms in each period. Thus, each producer of a new intermediate
good holds a patent only for the period during which it is bought, imply-
ing monopoly prots during that period only; yet patents last forever. By
arbitrage, therefore,
Qt = 
I
t : (18)
Meanwhile, rms engaged in design generate blueprints for new interme-
diate goods, using the same technology. Each rm produces a single design
and there is no aggregate uncertainty. The aggregate stock of designs evolves
according to
Mt+1  Mt = (K
G
t
KPt
)&
m
1 Mt
(1  %)NSYt
N
; (19)
which uses skilled workers, and depends on the public-private capital ratio
(Agénor and Alpaslan, 2014) and the stock of designs (Jones, 2005). To elimi-
nate scale e¤ects, it is the ratio of workers to total population that is specied
in the production function4
Prot maximisation by the design rms (by selecting NSYt ) involves max-
imising t = Qt(Mt+1  Mt)   [wSt (1   %)NSYt ] subject to the skilled wage,
yields a rst-order condition of
wSt =
Qt(k
G
t )
&m1 Mt
NSYt
; (20)
4See Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999).
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where kGt = K
G
t =K
P
t . In turn, by substituting in the expression for Qt, the
skilled wage in the private sector is given by
wSt =
[(kGt )
&m1 (1  )]Yt
NSYt
: (21)
2.4 Wages-Setting
To obtain a model equilibrium with non-zero unemployment, we adopt the
straightforward labour market institution of a right-to-manage union bargain-
ing framework. Following Agénor and Lim (2017), two separate but similar
unions exist one each for the unskilled and skilled workers in the private
sector where the wage-setting process takes place between a centralised trade
union and rms. The unionsobjectives are to maximise the expected current
income of its members, subject to wage and employment targets, taking the
existing capital stock (for unskilled) and design stock (for skilled ) as given.
The unions therefore do not internalise the e¤ect of future wages on the rms
decision to accumulate capital and thus future labour demand, e¤ectively
making it a static optimisation problem at every period t.5
Specically, for h = UY; SY , the union sets wUt or w
S
t with the objective of
maximising a utility function that depends on deviations of both employment
and wages from their target levels, subject to the labour demand schedule
for each type. Normalising the employment target to zero, the unions utility
function takes the standard form
Vht = (w
h
t   whTt )
h
(Nht )
1 h ; (22)
5An alternative specication is to consider a Nash wage bargaining process, in which
case then the labour demand is derived from the bargaining process instead of rmsprot
maximisation decision. However, given that the two types of workers work in di¤erent
sectors, and that the di¤erence in bargaining features will not result in signicant di¤erence
to the unemployment-corruption nexus, we use the more convenient right-to-manage model
where unions set wage taking labour demand schedule of rms as given. See Bhattacharyya
and Gupta (2015) for a direct comparison of the two specications.
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where h = UY; SY , h 2 (0; 1), andNht is given in (12). The term whTt measures
the unions target wage, whereas h reects the relative importance that the
union attaches to wage deviations from that target.
Maximising (22) with respect to wht gives the actual wage as a mark-up
(which is increasing in h) over the target wage, we get
wht = (
1  h
1  2h )w
hT
t : (23)
We specify the target wages to be linearly dependent on the minimum
level of income a worker would otherwise earn if unemployed, bt, adjusted
(negatively) to the unemployment rate of the respective category of workers,
as in
whTt = bt(
h
t )
 {hwh0 ; h = UL; SL (24)
where {UL; {SL > 0, wh0 and 
h
t , h = UL; SL denote a shift parameter and
the unemployment rate (in proportion of N) of labour category h, with
bt = t
Yt
N
; (25)
where t > 0 is an endogenously determined (by the governments allocation)
benet/social security indexation ratio variable. Consistent with most spec-
ication, it is also indexed to the level of per capita income in each period
t.6 ;7
Using (23), (24), and (25), we can derive an alternative expression for wUt
6Unlike Agénor and Lim (2017), which focuses on examining the impacts of various labour
market policies in developed and upper-middle income economies, the focus of this paper, the
corruption-unemployment nexus, is usually more relevant in a developing economy context
most of which have non-binding minimum wage and unemployment benets. As such, bt in
this context can be interpreted as some form of social security payment or cash transfers to
meet the minimum income of the unemployed.
7In relatively parsimonious partial equilibrium model, such as Heer and Morgenstern
(2005), the unemployment benet is indexed to previous periods earnings. While our
indexation is to the same-period income per capita, t is endogenous here, which then
allows for much richer dynamic feedback from the system into the benet indexation.
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and wSt , as in
wUt = t(
1  U
1  2U )w
U
0 (
Yt
N
)(ULt )
 {U ; (26)
and
wSt = t(
1  S
1  2S )w
S
0 (
Yt
N
)(SLt )
 {S ; (27)
respectively.
2.5 Public Sector
Based on the public procurement framework of Blackburn et al. (2011) and
Haque and Kneller (2015), the government is specied to hire public o¢ cials
(paying non-taxable market salary, wSt ) to procure capital goods to be used
for public investment. All public o¢ cials are assumed to be corruptible in this
model, though given the non-taxable nature of income, skilled labour hired as
public o¢ cials will always prefer to work for the government than in the private
sector. This ensures the allocation of talent condition in Acemoglu and Verdier
(1998) would hold, as the government can ensure complete bureaucratic partic-
ipation just by paying the skilled market wage, wSt . As shown later, to nance
the public o¢ cialssalaries, the government allocates a constant fraction, G,
of the government revenue each period as public emoluments.
On aggregate, the government demands gt amount of capital goods, which
is a constant fraction of the nal output in the economy,  Yt (Blackburn et al.
2010; Blackburn et al. 2011; Haque and Kneller 2015). For convenience, we
assume that the government sets  in accordance to the initial public capital-
nal output ratio, KG0 =Y0, hence  = K
G
0 =Y0, and keeps this ratio constant
over time. As such, in an economy with corruption and leakages, there is a
gap between the aggregate public capital level demanded by the government
for the economy and the actual supply of the public capital-nal output ratio
in each period t, KGt =Yt, due to corruption.
8
8As would be seen in the policy experiments later, we analyse an additional case where
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Each public o¢ cial is responsible to procure gt=NSGt units of capital goods
and claim the corresponding spending o¤ the total governmental allocation
to public infrastructure investment. In each period t, due to an imperfect
monitoring e¤ort made by the government, it is assumed, for simplicity, that
a corrupted public o¢ cial faces a random probability, p 2 (0; 1) of avoiding
being caught, and probability, 1   p, of being caught. Public o¢ cials being
caught are ned the full amount of his wage income, therefore left with zero
income.9
Based on similar interpretation of Chakraborty and Dabla-Norris (2011),
public investment projects are assumed to yield high- or low-quality of public
capital, and this partially depends on the capital goods purchase decisions
made by the public o¢ cials. A low-quality purchase yields only  < 1 units
of productive capital good despite costing 1 unit of good. A high-quality
purchase always yields 1 unit of productive capital good, though it is subject
to di¤erent cost, indexed by .  assumes a uniform distribution with support
(1; max). The government is aware of the overall distribution of the cost,
though it does not observe the true cost and quality of the goods procured,
therefore have to rely on the public o¢ cials for information. As such, similar
to Haque and Kneller (2015), potential corruption opportunity arises because
an o¢ cial can falsify information by over-reporting the unit cost. However,
unlike their binary specication,  is a continuous distribution, which later
 t is endogenous and varies over time. In this case, the government is assumed to attempt
to close the gap between the aggregate demand and supply of public capital good-to-nal
output ratio by resetting its demand in each period.
9The benchmark simplication approach to the governments monitoring technology is
simply adopted from Blackburn et al. (2011) and Haque and Kneller (2015). In line with
the standard Shapiro-Stiglitz shirking model, this means the probability of being detected
is related one-to-one with the monitoring intensity (see van Schaik and de Groot (2000) for
an example). Thus, although given at the level of each individual public o¢ cial, it is in
principle treated as a choice variable by the government, which would normally vary with
unit monitoring costs. Later, for the purposes of sensitivity analysis, this probability of
getting caughthence the monitoring intensityis endogenised and allowed to vary across
time, depending on the total share of corrupt individuals in the economy, "tNSGt = N .
16
allows us to model the share of corrupt o¢ cials endogenously. Plus, a corrupt
o¢ cial will not be able to claim the maximum amount, max, because the
government knows the upper bound , therefore will always claim his/her
respective optimal cost at time t, t.
A public o¢ cial that is not corrupt is always going to maximise public
capital good quality per unit of expnditure. Specically, the o¢ cial procures
gt=N
SG
t units of capital goods (with quality gt=N
SG
t ) at the actual realised
cost. On average, if no one is corrupt in the economy, the claim made by a
public o¢ cial is therefore  = (1 + max)=2. In this instance, a public o¢ cial
will therefore earn (1  %)wSt (recall that % has been spent in acquiring skills).
However, there is corruption opportunity due to the uncertainty associated
with the cost. If a public o¢ cial were to be to corrupt, he/she procures
gt=N
SG
t units of capital goods (but with low-quality, [gt=N
SG
t ]). On average, a
corrupt o¢ cial spends  per unit ([gt=NSGt ]), but claims the optimal amount,
t 2 (; max), making a personal gain of (t )[gt=NSGt ] on top of the wage10.
For a corrupt public o¢ cial, with an exogenous probability 1   p, the
o¢ cial is apprehended and conscated of all his income. With a probability
p, the o¢ cial succeeds in evading detection and therefore has an income of
[(1  %)wSt   tct] + (optimal   )[gt=NSGt ]  hct. As such, a public o¢ cial will
embezzle the public funds if his/her expected payo¤ is at least as good as not
doing so. This gives
p

((1  %)wSt   tct) + (t  
1 + max
2
)
gt
NSGt
  hct

 (1  %)wSt   tct; (28)
where hct is the resources spent by a corrupt o¢ cial to attempt to conceal
his/her behaviour. Similar to Haque and Kneller (2015), hct is assumed to be
10By implication, in the context of studies such as Blackburn et al. (2011) and Haque and
Kneller 2015), this is similar to saying that those public o¢ cials whose actual realised cost
falls between  and max is corruptible, while those facing cost below  is non-corruptible.
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an increasing function of the illegal income, (t   )(gt=NSGt ), given by
hct =

SLt
ULt

(t  
1 + max
2
)
gt
NSGt
; (29)
where  > 0. Unlike their specication, the concealment cost does not depend
on the share of corrupt o¢ cials ("t), which is endogenous in this model11. In-
stead, it depends on the ratio of skilled over unskilled unemployment rate in the
economy, which is a novel feature of this model. The former is consistent with
the uemployment-as-disciplinary device specication of most Shapiro-Stiglitz
type of models, where the higher the skilled unemployment rate is, the more
costly for an o¢ cial to corrupt, hence the concealment cost. In contrast, the
higher the unskilled unemployment rate is in the economy, it is easier/cheaper
for the corrupt o¢ cials to conceal their behaviours, which is consistent with the
informal sector interpretation that sustained unemployment tends to translate
to an increase in hidden economic activities arena where embezzled funds
can be concealed.
Holding the incentive condition (28) in equality, and using gt =  Yt, (6),
(12), (29), we can derive a threshold value for the unit cost, t , above which
a public o¢ cial will choose to be corrupt:
t = +
(1  p)
p

1  
at
(SYt (1  ) + SGt )

(1 %)t  1N
SG
t
NSYt
"
1 

SLt
ULt
# 1
;
(30)
where t = [(kGt )
&m1 (1  )].
On aggregate, the law of large numbers means probability of individual
level equals the actual outcomes. At any time t, within the support (; max),
11The convenient specication of Haque and Kneller (2015) contradicts the model property
of Lui (1986), which implies easier concealment when corruption becomes more prevalent.
It also relies on the fact that the total number of public o¢ cials (NSGt ) is constant, is not
suitable here due to the endogeneity of both NSGt and "t. "t is determined based on the
distribution of  here, and in an economy where NSGt is expanding, the concealment cost
may not be increasing with the NSGt .
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we know that the number of corrupt o¢ cials equals NSGt
R max
t
f()d. The
share of corrupted o¢ cials (as percentage of total public o¢ cials), "t, can
therefore be computed as:
"t =
max   t
max    ; (31)
where t and  are as dened.
Compared to Haque and Kneller (2015), the share of corrupt public o¢ -
cials, "t, in this model is determined by the varying distribution of cost/proteering
opportunity by inating expenditure. However, for the non-corrupt group, 1 
"t, the aggregate outcome is di¤erent from if there is no corruption. Specif-
ically, the average claim made by non-corrupt public o¢ cials would equal
(1 + t )=2, instead of  (if there is no corruption). On aggregate, the actual
quality of public capital goods procured is therefore expressed as
GKt = (1  "t)NSGt
gt
NSGt
+ "tN
SG
t 
gt
NSGt
= [1  "t(1 )]gt; (32)
while the total claims led by the public o¢ cials add up to
GIt = (1  "t)NSGt
(1 + t )
2
gt
NSGt
+ "tN
SG
t
(t + 
max)
2
gt
NSGt
= f(1  "t)[(0:5)(1 + t )] + "t[(0:5)(t + max)]ggt: (33)
2.6 Public Finance
In terms of the scal budget, the government is assumed to maintain a balanced
budget at all time and cannot issue bonds to borrow. To nance its general
outlays, the government levies a tax on non-public sector workerswages at
the rate  , plus the salaries conscated from apprehended corrupt o¢ cials.
These outlays consist of the public emoluments, GGt , the funds allocated for
public invesment (public capital goods purchase in this context), GIt , another
funds allocated to provide minimum income in the form of social security
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payment/unemployment benets to those unemployed in the economy, GSt ,
and spending on other items, GOt , assuming to be non-directly productive. It
imposes no fees for its services.
The governments general budget is given by
GGt +G
I
t+G
S
t +G
O
t = fwUt NUYt +NSYt [(1 %)wSt  tct]g+(1 p)"t(1 %)wSt NSGt ;
(34)
where
GGt = (1  %)wSt NSGt : (35)
Shares of spending are constant fractions of government revenues:
Git = iffwUt NUYt +NSYt [(1 %)wSt  tct]g+(1 p)"t(1 %)wSt NSGt g; i = G; I; S;O
(36)
where i 2 (0; 1). Combining (34) and (36) therefore yields
I + G + S + O = 1: (37)
The tax-free nature of public o¢ cialswage income means skilled workers
will always prefer to work as government o¢ cials, though the total number
employed at any period t, NSGt , is largely determined by the share of govern-
ment revenues allocated to expenditure on emoluments. As seen in Appendix,
equating (35) and (36) for GGt , we can derive an expression for the share of
public o¢ cials in the economy, SGt = N
SG
t =
N , as:
SGt =
NSGt
N
=
G
n
U
t
+

1  (1 )
[0:5(1+aCt )]

SYt
St
o
SYtn
[1  G(1  p)"t] + G [0:5(1+aCt )]
SYt
St
o ; (38)
where again, t = [(kGt )
&m1 (1   )], and ht , h = U; S; UY; SY; SG denote the
proportion of individuals of the respective category h in the adult population
N .
In terms of public investment, the governments allocation, GIt is based on
the total claims made by public o¢ cials, not the actual quality. As such, even
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with assumed full depreciation, the evolution of public capital stock, KGt+1 =
GKt , but K
G
t+1 6= GIt , with the di¤erence being the public funds embezzled by
the corrupt o¢ cials. The evolution of public capital is therefore characterised
by
KGt+1 = G
K
t
= [1  "t(1 )]gt
= [1  "t(1 )] Yt: (39)
Let 't denotes a variable measuring the e¢ ciency of public investment (a
measure often modelled as exogenous, time-invariant parameter in standard
growth models with public investment (see Agénor(2012))). As shown in the
Appendix, we can compute 't by dividing (34) with (36), which yields
't =
GKt
GIt
=
[1  "t(1 )] 
fI [U + t(1  %)(1  [0:5(1+aCt )] (
SY
t (1  ) + SGt ))
+(1  p)(1  %)t"t 
SG
t
SYt
]g
Yt
KPt
:
(40)
In terms of the unemployment insurance/social security fund, the ows
accounting can be expressed as
bt[
UL
t +(1 %)SLt ] N = SffwUt NUYt +NSYt [(1 %)wSt  tct]g+(1 p)"t(1 %)wSt NSGt g;
which as shown in the Appendix, allows us to derive an expression for the
benet indexation variable, t:
t =
n
S[
U + t(1  %)(1  [0:5(1+aCt )] (
SY
t (1  ) + SGt )) + (1  p)(1  %)t"t 
SG
t
SYt
]
o
ULt + (1  %)SLt
:
(41)
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2.7 Labour Market Identities and Savings-Investment
Balance
To close the model, the equilibrium condition of the market for unskilled labour
(and the relevant shares in terms of ratios) is given by
NUt = N
UL
t +N
UY
t ; and 
U
t = 
UL
t + 
UY
t , (42)
where Ut = N
U
t = N , which from (8) equals to a
C
t . Thus, the probability of em-
ployment for an unskilled individual, UYt , and the probability of an unskilled
individual becoming unemployed, ULt , are given respectively by
UYt =
NUYt
NUt
=
UYt
Ut
; and ULt = 1  UYt =
NULt
NUt
=
ULt
Ut
: (43)
The equilibrium condition of the market for (e¤ective) skilled labour is
given by
NSt = N
SY
t +N
SG
t +N
SL
t ; and 
S
t = 
SY
t + 
SG
t + 
SL
t : (44)
The employment and unemployment probabilities for skilled workers are
given by
SYt =
NSYt
NSt
=
SYt
St
; SGt =
NSGt
NSt
=
SGt
St
; (45)
and SLt = 1  SYt   SGt =
NSLt
NSt
=
SLt
St
.
For the saving-investment balance, assuming full depreciation, the saving-
investment balance requires private capital in t + 1 to be equal to savings in
period t by all individuals born in t  1:12
KPt+1 = (s
U;Y
t N
UY
t + s
U;L
t N
UL
t ) + [s
SY
t N
SY
t + +s
S;L
t N
SL
t (46)
+sSG;Nct (1  "t)NSGt + sSG;c;pt "tNSG;c;pt ]:
12For convenience, we assume that the corrupt o¢ cials (that are not caught) are able to
invest the embezzled funds and earn standard market interest rate. Alternative, we could
have specied the model such that the embezzled funds can be invested in the black market
and earns a fraction of the market interest rate. This does not make a signicant di¤erence
to the results.
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3 Dynamic System and Balanced Growth Equi-
librium
In this economy, an imperfect equilibrium with corruption and unemployment is
a sequence of consumption and saving allocations fch;jtjt ; ch;jtjt+1; sh;jt g1t=0, for h =
U; SY; SG, j = E;L, prices of production inputs fwUt ; wSt ; rt+1g1t=0, existing
blueprint varieties fMtg1t=0, private capital fKPt g1t=0, public capital fKGt g1t=0,
such that, given initial stocks M0; KP0 ; K
G
0 > 0,
a) all individuals, skilled or unskilled, employed or unemployed, publicly
or privately employed, maximise utility by choosing consumption subject to
their intertemporal budget constraint, taking factor prices, the tax rate, and
the unemployment benet as given;
b) the public o¢ cials maximise utility by choosing the cost to report (hence
to corrupt or not to corrupt), taking the overall distribution of the purchase
cost, , the probability of being detected, the quality of the nal goods, and
the public funds allocated for public investment as given;
c) rms in the nal good sector maximise prots by choosing labour, private
capital, and intermediate inputs, taking factor prices as given;
d) intermediate producers set prices so as to maximise prots, given the
perceived aggregate demand curve for their product;
e) design rms maximise prots by choosing skilled labour, taking wages,
patent prices, and public-private capital ratio as given;
f ) each equilibrium design fee extracts all prots made by the correspond-
ing intermediate producer; and
g) the trade union sets wages so as to maximise its utility, subject to the
demand for labour by rms in the nal good sector;
h) the nal good market clears;
i) unemployment of both categories of workers prevails; and
j ) non-zero share of corrupt o¢ cials prevails among the public o¢ cials.
A balanced growth equilibrium is an equilibrium with corruption and un-
employment in which
a) fch;jtjt ; ch;jtjt+1; sh;jt g1t=0, for h = U; SY; SG, j = E;L, and KPt , KGt , Yt,
wUt , w
S
t , bt, grow at the constant, endogenous rate 1 + , implying that the
blueprint-private capital ratio and the public-private capital ratio is constant;
b) the rate of return on capital, 1 + rt+1, is constant;
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c) the threshold level of individuals who choose to remain unskilled, aCt , is
constant;
d) the threshold level of cost above which public o¢ cials opt to corrupt,
t , is constant;
e) the fractions of the skilled and unskilled labour force employed in man-
ufacturing, UYt and 
SY
t , and the fraction of o¢ cials employed in the public
sector, SGt , are constant;
f ) the proportion of the public o¢ cials who are corrupt, "t, is constant;
g) the benet indexation variable (as a ratio of income per capita), t, is
constant;
h) the price of intermediate goods Pt and the fee Qt, is constant;
i) skilled and unskilled unemployment rates, ULt and 
SL
t , are constant;
and
j ) employment and unemployment probabilities, UYt , 
SY
t , 
SG
t , and 
UL
t ,
SLt are constant.
In terms of properties of the equilibrium, as shown in the Apppendix, the
dynamics of the model are mainly driven by the two di¤erence equations of
KGt =K
P
t andMt=K
P
t , as well as core static equations in terms of the nal good-
private capital ratio, Yt=KPt , the threshold level of ability (or equivalently the
share of unskilled workers), aCt , the shares of skilled workers in nal good
production and public sector, SYt and 
SG
t , the proportion of public o¢ cials
that are corrupt, "t, the threshold level of procurement cost, 

t , the share
of unskilled workers in nal good production, UYt , the shares of skilled and
unskilled workers in unemployment, SLt and 
UL
t , and the benet indexation
ratio, t . For the case in which  t =K
G
t =Yt is endogenous and varies over time,
the relevant  s in the derived equations are replaced by KGt =K
P
t / Yt=K
P
t , and
a relatively more complicated system is solved separately.
A key step in deriving the equilibrium growth rate is to establish the re-
strictions needed on the congestion parameters in (10). Let mt = Mt=KPt , this
involves setting U =  and + = + + ! = 1. Rearranging terms, we can
then yield an expression for Yt as a linear function of KPt :
Yt =
(kGt )
!=(1 )()=(1 )
[(UYt )
U ] 1=(1 )

mt
(1 )=	=(1 ) KPt : (47)
To determine the growth rate of nal output, 1 + t, note that the growth
rate of nal output equals the growth rate of physical capital. As shown in
the Appendix, this means we can calculate growth rate in each period t as
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1+t =
KPt+1
KPt
= 
Yt
KPt
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
(1  )U + ULt + (1  )
h
1  [SYt (1 )+SGt ]
[0:5(1+Ut )]

i
t(1  %)
+(1  %)
h
SLt   [
SY
t (1 )+SGt ]
[0:5(1+Ut )]
 t
SLt
SYt
i
+(1  "t)t(1  %) 
SG
t
SYt
h
1  [SYt (1 )+SGt ]
[0:5(1+Ut )]

i
+p"tt(1  %) 
SG
t
SYt
h
1  [SYt (1 )+SGt ]
[0:5(1+Ut )]

i
+ p"t 

1 

SLt
ULt
 h
t 1
2
i
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
:
(48)
Given the complexity of the system, both the solutions and the stability
of the system cannot be studied analytically. However, it is established nu-
merically based on a parameterised model by solving for an initial balanced
growth equilibrium that satises the properties dened earlier and verifying
that following a shock, the system converges to a new equilibrium.
4 Model Parameterisation
To examine the model properties and to study the general equilibrium e¤ects
of policy parameters, we parameterise the system based on the federal republic
of Nigeria, a lower-middle income, Sub-Saharan African economy historically
known for having widespread corruption (Bakare, 2011) and structural unem-
ployment (Kester et al, 2016). The current President Buharis administration
identied corruption and unemployment as main policy priorities, against the
bakdrop of continuing poor public service delivery and sluggish growth. The
parameterisations are based primarily on o¢ cial statistics obtained from the
various publications of the National Bureau of Statistics, Nigeria (NBS Nige-
ria). Unless specied otherwise, all statistics are based on the average during
the 2011-15 period.
On the household sector, the annual discount rate is set at 0:04. With
a 25 years OLG structure, this gives an intergenerational discount rate of
0:375. The household savings rate, , is estimated using the household survey
data. Specically, based on average monthly income of NGN50,000 minus o¤
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consumption expenditure, the household savings rate is estimated to be 9:3
percent. For the time spent in tertiary education, based on a standard 3:5
years spent in the university, % = 3:5=25 = 0:140 is obtained. In terms of
e¢ ciency of training, the parameter  is set at 0:7, which is in between the
0:9 set by Agénor and Lim (2017) for high-income economy and the 0:5 set
by Agénor and Alpaslan (2014) for the poorest low-income economy. In the
absence of training cost data, the parameterised value for the skills acquisition
cost (proportion to skilled wages), , is solved for using the equation for Ut ,
written below for convenience:
U = 1=

1  (1  %) 1 [
UY (1  ) + UL  (1  %)SL]
SY (1  ) + SG (
SY
[(kG)&
m
1 (1  )] )
 1=
:
To solve for , we still need the tax rate (), information from the inter-
mediate goods and design sector (&m1 , , ), the initial values for k
G, and the
relevant labour shares and probabilities. The tax rate on wages,  = 0:058, is
estimated by dividing the total tax revenue as percentage of GDP (obtained
from World Bank World Development Indicators) by the labour share of the
GDP in Nigeria. The latter is calculated based on the compensation of employ-
ees amount in the national income statistics, yielding 0:28. This also provides
the value for the elasticity of nal good production to employed labour ratio
in the nal good sector,  = 0:28. For the rest of the production parameters in
the nal good sector, the elasticity parameter with respect to private capital,
, is set at 0:35, following Agénor and Lim (2017) and within the standard
range for developing economies. Constant return-to-scale assumption for the
production function means  = 1      = 0:37. Lastly, for the elasticity of
production with respect to the public-private capital ratio, ! is set at 0:173,
in line with the meta-analysis of Bom and Ligthart (2014).
In the intermediate goods and design sector, the substitution parameter,
, is set at 0:39, which is consistent with Lim (2015) and the non-competitive
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scenario examined in Sequeira (2011). For the elasticity with respect to public
capital, &m1 , we use the lower-range estimate of Agénor and Neanidis (2015),
&m1 = 0:10, which is the same as the value used in Agénor and Alpaslan (2014).
Before moving on to the public sector and the unions, rst, we sort out
the initial steady-state values for the labour variables, especially those that
are required in the calculation of . The share of unskilled workers in the
population, U , is set equal to 0:847, which is calculated by subtracting the
share of workers with post-secondary qualication in Nigeria as at end-2015.
This gives S = 0:141. Using the same publication from the NBS Nigeria,
the skilled, SL, and unskilled unemployment rate, UL, are calculated using
the raw unemployed numbers as at end-2015, which gives SL = 0:036 and
UL = 0:106, with the weighted average gives the headline unemployment rate
of 0:104. The probability of a skilled worker getting unemployed, SLt = 0:255,
and the probability of an unskilled worker getting unemployed, UL = 0:125,
are easily derived. After that, the share of unskilled workers hired in the pri-
vate sector, UY , and the corresponding probability, UY , can be calculated,
where UY = U   UL = 0:741, and UY = UY =U = 0:875. For the share of
public o¢ cials, rst we know that the number of skilled civil servants at grade
GL12-GL17 of Nigerian public service as at end-2015 equals 141; 515. Divid-
ing this by the total labour force as reported by the World Bank, 59:1 million,
gives SG = 0:0024, and the corresponding probability, SG = 0:017. The share
of skilled labour employed in the private sector, SY = 0:103, and the corre-
sponding probability, SY = SY =S = 0:728, can then be calculated. Lastly,
in the absence of public capital stock data, the public-private capital ratio,
kG, is set at 0:16, which corresponds to the average estimate for the non-high
income, Sub-Saharan African economies used in Agénor and Alpaslan (2014).
Given all these initial values, we can then calculate the skills acquisition cost,
, which equals to 0:229.
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In terms of the union bargaining parameters, U and S, to our knowledge,
there is no econometric estimation for the union wage premium in Nigeria. As
such, we rely on the estimate of Barnerjee et al. (2008) for South Africa, which
documented a wage mark-up of 1:23 times. Using (23), U = S = 0:158 are
estimated. The same problem arises with the wage elasticities with respect to
unemployment level, {U and {S. Using the average elasticity estimated by
Kingdon and Knight (2006), again for South Africa, we set both {U and {S
to equal 0:108.
For the remaining variables and parameters in the public sector, using per-
sonnel cost data in the Public Finance Statistics published by the NBS Nigeria,
G = 0:337 is estimated. The share of spending on public infrastructure, I ,
is obtained by dividing the public infrastructure investment as a percentage of
GDP as at end-2015 with the total government expenditure as a percentage
of GDP, which gives I = 0:187. The share of total social spending/benets
as a percentage of government expenditure, S, cannot be ascertained directly
from the public nance statistics, and therefore needs to be solved for us-
ing (41). This requires us to rst estimate the initial steady-state value of
. In general, Nigeria is a federation of states where both the minium wage
and unemployment benets are not uniformly binding across all states. How-
ever, as at end-2015, the minimum wage stands at NGN18,000 (approximately
USD55). Dividing this over an average income per capita of USD2,671, we set
 = 0:02. To estimate for the initial share of corrupt o¢ cials, " (which is
always contentious to do so), we use a combination of the numbers (propor-
tion of civil servants declaring their assets) published in the Social Statistics
Report 2016 and the percentage of rms making informal payments to public
o¢ cials in Nigerianumber contained in the World Development Indicators.
The share of civil servants not declaring their assets equals 0:425, while the
latter is about 0:79. Assuming that this is representative of the share of those
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non-declared o¢ cers who are corrupt, we estimate " = 0:336. In terms of the
probability of being detected, 1  p, in order to be consistent with the Buhari
administrations renewed commitments in tackling corruption (as evidenced
by the recent spike in convicted o¤ence), we set 1   p = 0:8, or equivalently,
p = 0:2. This therefore indicates a relatively robust monitoring technology, de-
spite the high corruption rate, and rules out potentially the use of a foolproof
exogenous p shock as a straightforward policy measure to tackle corruption in
the next section. Given all the parameterised initial values and parameters,
S is estimated using (41), which gives S = 0:125. Lastly, we still need to
estimate max and then determine the initial steady-state value of . Given
all the calibrated parameters and initial values, we rst calculate     us-
ing (30), which gives 0:098. Solving this simultaneously with (31), we obtain
 = 1:246, max = 1:296, and subsequently,  = 1:148.
The nal output-private capital ratio, Y=KP , is estimated using GDP and
private capital stock series obtained from the Penn World Table 9, which gives
Y=KP = 0:524 for Nigeria. This, couple with the initial steady-state value of
public-private capital ratio, kG = 0:16, allows for the calculation of  , which
equals 0:305. Following Agenor and Lim (2017), the blueprint-private capital
stock ratio, m, is normalised to 0:1, largely for convenience and the fact that
this initial ratio is immaterial to the results. The public investment e¢ ciency
ratio, 't, is set equal to 0:285, which is based on the 1.14 index score (out
of 4.0) estimated by Dabla-Norris et al. (2012). Finally, the annual growth
rates for nal output and private capital in the initial steady state are equal
to 4:7 percent, which corresponds to the average real GDP growth rate of
Nigeria during the period 2011-15. The calibrated parameters and the initial
steady-state values are summarised in Table 1 and 2 respectively.
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5 Policy Experiments
In line with the recent policy development in Nigeria, we start o¤ by consid-
ering two policy scenarios: (i) public sector downsizing (a cut in G), which
is a measure widely documented to be undertaken by the Obasanjo govern-
ment in the late 1990s (Kester et al., 2016); and (ii) an attempt raise in
minimum income by increasing the endogenous social security/benet rate,
t, which can be achieved by increasing the share of spending in social se-
curity/benets in the budget, S. The latter is consistent with President
Buharis Social Intervention Scheme, which when simulated together with a
training cost cut, , allows for potentially achieving the simultaneous goal of
job creation/unemployment reduction. In addition, we also consider a scenario
where there is a reduction in the unskilled workersunion mark-up, which is
usually a popular policy means in the labour market reform literature to be
used in increasing the absoprtion of unskilled workers into the workforce.
After that, we simulate a conventional public infrastructure-push policy
scenario by increasing I . To preview, readers experienced in economic dy-
namics would notice from the Appendix that, in a corruption model with
leakages such as this (where the actual quality does not depend on on-paper
reported expenditure), the parameter I is policy-neutral and does not appear
anywhere in the di¤erence equation system, saved for the public investment
e¢ ciency index, 't. To overcome this characteristic of the benchmark solution,
we examine a policy scenario with endogenous threshold. Specically, assum-
ing a policy scenario where after a period of ambitious anti-corruption reform
reducing the corruption rate, "t, to below a certain threshold level, the dynam-
ics of the system would then change, in which equation (39) is replaced by the
actual on-paper measure of (36). This may be interpreted as the government
successfully reducing the corruption rate to a negligible level, hence closing
the reporting gap between public nance and actual public procurement.
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As mentioned, for all the experiments, in addition to the benchmark case,
we also consider sensitivity analysis cases where there is (i) endogenous  t;
(ii) evolving probability p over time, by virtue of the one-to-one relationship
with monitoring intensity13; and (iii) a linear specication for the concealment
cost (elasticity parameter,  = 1:0 ), which also implies a stronger relationship
between the unemployment rates and the concealment cost). All the policy
shocks considered are permanent and their impact is measured in terms of a few
key vaßriables the public investment e¢ ciency index, the corruption rate, the
unemployment rates, the size of the public sector employment, and the growth
rate of the nal output. Unless specied otherwise, all policy experimented
involves a 10 percent increase/decrease. All the simulation results (impact
and steady-state e¤ects) are summarised in Tables 3-6, with the transitional
dynamics associated with selected policy experiments (primarily to save space)
presented in Figures 1-4.14
5.1 Public Sector Downsizing
First, consider a 10 percent cut in the share of spending on public emoluments,
G, where the saved amount gets reallocated to other non-directly productive
expenditure component, O. Both the impact and steady-state e¤ects are pre-
sented in Table 3, with the transitional dynamics of key variables illustrated
13A common specication used in the development economics literature to model gradual
evolution involves assuming p to evolve according to pt = (pt 1)P (pm
N
"tNSGt
)1 P , where
P , set equal to 0:8 here, essentially means a high persistence for p. However, in consis-
tent with studies such as Haque and Kneller (2015), we assume that it gets easier for the
government to detect corruption the larger the share of corrupt o¢ cials becomes in the
population.
14Similar to Agénor and Alpaslan (2014), Agénor and Lim (2017), and other OLG models
examining transitional dynamics in the literature, there is a distinction between generational
periods (T ) and simulated period (t). In principle, T corresponds to 25 years in the OLG
structure, as reected in the discount factor and the assumption of full depreciation of
physical capital. However, all of the other parameters and variables either do not have a
time dimension or are calibrated on the basis of average annual data. For the numerical
experiments, the intended length of a unit of time interval is therefore t = 1=25, or best
understood as one year.
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in Figure 1. From (38), we see that a G cut has a direct downward shift e¤ect
on the e¤ective share of public o¢ cials, SGt , in the economy. Given initial
xed amount of e¤ective skilled labour, St , and those employed in the private
sector, SYt , this means there is a corresponding increase in skilled unemploy-
ment, SLt , on impact. On the surface, by virtue of the specication of (29), the
intended aim of such a policy intervention may be to provide an uemployment-
as-disciplinary, corruption-prevention incentive for the public o¢ cials, at the
cost of a slight increase in skilled unemployment. However, in this model
where public spending on emoluments have productive implications (despite
the possibility of corruption), and there are richer feedback mechanisms, the
general equilibrium e¤ects of public sector workforce downsizing actually leads
to more corruption in the economy. First, given that the non-tax deductible
skilled wage of a public o¢ cial represents the best job possibility for a skilled
worker, the fall in the probability of a skilled worker getting employed as a
public o¢ cial means a decline in the expected skilled wages. This results in
a disincentive for skills acquisition in the economy, which is reected in the
increase (decrease) in the share of unskilled (skilled) workers in the economy.
This larger unskilled workforce then has a proportionate impact on the un-
skilled unemployment rate.
At the same time, in the public sector, less number of public o¢ cials means,
given xed units of public capital goods demanded in each period, gt, each re-
maining public o¢ cial is now in-charged of procuring more. This gives more
potential room for the inating of procurement cost, or mathematically, trans-
lates to a larger gap between the incentive for corruption threshold, t , and
the maximum-reportable max, as seen in (30). Indeed, this direct e¤ect dom-
inates the e¤ect of the unemployment ratio has on the concealment cost. For
any given number of public o¢ cials that is remaining employed by the public
sector, the share of those corrupt o¢ cials therefore rises. There is then a wider
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gap between the actual quality of public capital and the reported investment
expenses, hence translating to a decline in public investment e¢ ciency.
Over the long-run, for a given gt=NSGt unit of procurement responsibil-
ity, smaller NSGt translates to an overall smaller gt, which implies a smaller
public-to-private capital ratio in the economy. In the steady state, this is
slightly detrimental to growth a decline in nal output growth rate in the
order of  0:15 percentage points. In terms of the labour market, in the steady
state, the level e¤ect associated with the overall drop in the total pool of skilled
workers eventually overwrite the positive impact of skilled unemployment rate,
resulting in a steady-state net decline in SLt in the order of  0:03 percent-
age points. The overall impact on the headline unemployment rate is mildly
positive, due to a larger steady-state increase in the unskilled unemployment
rate. In terms of the public sector, in the steady state, the corruption rate, "t,
ends up 7 percentage points higher, despite a smaller share of public o¢ cials in
the economy. This, coupled with the  0:6 percentage points change in public
investment e¢ ciency and negative output growth rate, means a vanilla public
sector downsizing strategy can be detrimental to such an economy. Indeed, it
can be argued that the steady-state policy e¤ects of an increase in the headline
unemployment rate, a decrease in public investment e¢ ciency, an increase in
the economywide corruption rate, and a slightly negative growth e¤ects are
largely consistent with the economic performance observed during the infa-
mous public sector downsizing era of the Obasanjo government, as described
by Kester et al. (2016). Both Table 3 and Figure 1 also illustrate the policy
e¤ects under the other three sensitivity scenarios, which present largely similar
policy dynamics to the benchmark case (in the case with endogenous  t, the
generated solutions are much more unstable, though the overall transitional
paths remain consistent).
In Table 1, we also consider an alternative scenario where the saved ex-
33
penses from a G cut is reallocated instead to social spending, S. Overall,
we see that the e¤ects are not much di¤erent from those observed in the pre-
vious scenario, only that the disincentive e¤ect on skills acquisition becomes
smaller (the cost associated with becoming unemployed after acquiring skills
[arisen from the retrenching public o¢ cials] is marginally smaller, given that
the level of unemployment benets received for the skilled unemployed is higher
in this scenario), with skills unemployment rate remains positive even in the
long-run. The steady-state corruption rate is also slightly lower, though the
negative growth e¤ect becomes relatively larger due to overall lower level of
production in the economy. This also suggests that the general equilibrium
e¤ects associated with a G cut is likely to dominate those associated with the
S rise, which is examined next.
5.2 Raising Minimum Income and Training
President Buharis Social Intervention Scheme (SIS) comes with the intention
of creating more jobs, while simultaneously raising the minimum income of
the population. In the context of this model, we consider policies of similar
nature, starting with a plain 10 percent increase in the share of social secu-
rity/benet spending, S, nanced by a reallocation from other non-directly
productive spending, O. The results are illustrated in both Table 4 and Fig-
ure 2. Compared to the previous scenario where such a scheme is nanced by
a cut in emoluments, the overall policy e¤ects are much improved.
In the context of the overall system, as seen in (41), an increase in S,
ceteris paribus, leads to a larger indexation rate, t. This means the minimal
income in the economy, bt, for a given level of per capita income, increases.
This results in the increase in both the expected skilled wage and the ex-
pected unskilled wage, though the e¤ect on the former tends to be slightly
larger (by virtue of the level, wSt > w
U
t ). This therefore creates a net positive
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skills acquisition incentive (level e¤ect), resulting in the overall expansion of
skilled workforce in the economy. Nevertheless, in terms of reallocation e¤ect,
this policy predictably, does badly in combatting unemployment, as both the
skilled and unemployment rates go up the former increases 0:3 percentage
points in the steady state, while the latter by 0:8 percentage points. The level
of employment in the private sector for both types of workers is lower, result-
ing in lower production and a negative impact e¤ect on real output growth, in
the order of  0:1 percentage points in the steady state.
Nevertheless, instead of labelling such a policy as ine¤ective in typical clas-
sical economic interpretation, this policy does have its merits in an economy
with corruption such as this. Overall, the net e¤ect or the change in unemploy-
ment ratio, SLt =
UL
t , is positive (by virtue of the initial level of skilled unem-
ployment being lower). From (29), this means the impact on concealment cost
is higher, as the uemployment-as-disciplinary, corruption-prevention incentive
is in action here. For any given cost associated with public procurement, the
required mark-up (inated cost) for any o¢ cial to corrupt becomes higher.
Specically, the incentive for corruption threshold, t , becomes larger, which
in turns resulting in a smaller gap between t and 
max. In the steady state,
the share of corrupt o¢ cials therefore falls by 0:6 percentage points.
Indeed, the conventional argument for the use of minimum wage and un-
employment benet provision tend to focus on their potential e¤ects in in-
centivising the poor to accumulate human capital. In other words, if such
a policy is associated with a simultaneous reduction in the skills acquisition
cost in the economy, then the economic implications are good. A crude ex-
periment to examine this involves simulating an increase in S and  each
by 10 percent, nanced by a 20 percent cut in O, as also shown in Table
4. The skills expansion e¤ect is predictable larger, which is associated with a
smaller deviation in unskilled unemployment rate (by implications, the overall
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headline unemployment rate), though still positive, and more importantly, a
positive steady-state e¤ect on real output growth rate. While this scenario
does result in a by-product of a slightly larger skilled unemployment rate, this
is warranted as, along with higher expected skills wage premium, it provides
a stronger corruption-prevention incentive, which in steady state, translates
to a  8 percentage point change in the share of corrupt o¢ cials. In others
words, the share of corrupt o¢ cials declines from the initial 33:6 percent of
total public o¢ cials to 25:6 percent. This decline in corruption, together with
the positive growth e¤ect associated with skills expansion, also leads to an
improved public investment e¢ ciency ratio by 0:4 percentage points.
5.3 Ambitious Social Reform Programme
As seen in the previous experiments, there is some merits in using a mini-
mum income/wage strategy in addressing corruption in a developing economy.
However, any ambitious social reform programme must necessarily also aim to
reduce the headline total unemployment rate. In the model context, a policy
that can achieve a reduction in unskilled unemployment rate is through union
reform one of the labour market institutions found by Bernal-Verdugo et al.
(2012) to be e¤ective in reducing unemployment for their non-OECD country
sample. More specically, consider a 10 percent reduction in the parameter
U , which governs the mark-up over the target wage for the unskilled work-
ers, as seen in (23)). In a non-technical context, within such a model where
there is no explicit distinction between participation rate, this may be inter-
preted as a policy designed to bring more unskilled workers into the employed
labour force.The same The results of this individual policy are summarised
in Table 5, with the transitional dynamics presented in Figure 3. In all four
cases analysed, the steady-state e¤ect on unskilled unemployment rate is con-
sistently negative. While the e¤ects on growth and skilled unemployment rate
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are marginally lower and higher respectively, this individual policy provides
another useful tool in tackling corruption while simultaneously reducing the
headline unemployment rate.
Next, we consider an ambitious composite reform programme, which has
overall policy elements that are consistent with the SIS in Nigeria. Speci-
cally, we consider an increase in S by 10 percent, a training cost cut, , by 20
percent, and a reduction in U by 20 percent (which translates to 1:17 times
of mark-up), with both the impact and steady-state results also presented in
Table 5. In the steady-state, we see that there is a robust increase in the
e¤ective share of skilled labour by 1:3 percentage points, a decline in head-
line unemployment rate in the order of  0:4 percentage points, and a positive
growth e¤ect of 0:25 percentage points. However, the absolute deviation of
public investment e¢ ciency index remains negative, and the skilled unemploy-
ment rate increases by 1:2 percentage points. With the policy tool of public
infrastructure investment share, I , being irrelevant in this dynamic system,
there is no room for the use of a conventional infrastructure-push policy to
address these two shortcomings. Nonetheless, in the benchmark case, the pro-
gramme is very e¤ective in reducing the public sector corruption rate in the
economy, with the benchmark case registering a steady-state deviation of the
order  25:9 percentage points, or equivalently, reducing corruption rate to
only 7:6 percent of the total public o¢ cials in the economy. Indeed, at some
point along the transition, corruption rate is reduced to an insignicant level,
which paves the way for a subsequent examination of an endogenous threshold
case in the following sub-section on public investment.
5.4 Public Investment in Infrastructure
As documented in Agénor (2012) and Agénor and Lim (2017), public invest-
ment in infrastructure, through its productivity-enhancing supply-side e¤ects,
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can be a powerful tool in raising nal output growth while addressing the
persistent absoprtion/skilled unemployment issue associated with a skills ex-
pansion policy. However, in a corruption-based model such as this where there
is a di¤erence between actual quality and reported public investment expenses,
a measure such as I becomes impotent (as seen in Table 6). Nevertheless, a
conceptually plausible composite reform strategy is to rst push the corruption
rate in the economy down to an insignicant level, after which the government
will be able to wipe out corruption and close the quality-reporting gap asso-
ciated with public investment. In such instance, I can then become a viable
policy tool in an economy free of corruption. Specically, we introduce an
endogenous threshold of (insignicant) corruption level, "^ = 0:03, after/below
which then the dynamics are driven by a slightly modied system in which
the numerator in the public-private capital ratio is replaced from (39) to the
public nance denition of (36), t = 
max, and corruption set at a constant
value.
For all four cases studied (benchmark, plus the other three sensitivity
analysis cases), we introduce this endogenous switching condition and exam-
ine again, the ambitious composite reform programme, plus an increase in I
also by 10 percent. The experiment results are summarised in Table 6, with
transitional dynamics presented in Figure 4. Of the four cases we studied,
only the benchmark model triggers the threshold condition where in period
t = 4, the corruption rate drops past "^ = 0:03. As such, for the dynamics
illustrated in Figure 4, save for the line labelled Benchmark (with switching)
and the graph for public investment e¢ ciency, the other four represent exactly
the same transitional dynamics that we would have observed for the composite
programme examined earlier (given the irrelevance of I prior to switching).
Comparing the benchmark case with and without switching, we see that
the subsequent introduction of I results in nal output growth rate to end
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at +0:3 percentage points at end-steady state. There is a huge gain in public
investment e¢ ciency as a result of the regime change, and the increase in
skilled unemployment rate has become much more manageable. Nonetheless,
the policy e¤ects on reducing unskilled and headline unemployment rate has
become not as e¤ective in such a hypothetical corruption-free model economy.
These results provide interesting food-for-thought on whether social policies
designed to reduce unemployment rate would work as well in a zero-corruption
economy, especially given the existence of the dynamic tradeo¤between skilled
unemployment and corruption.
6 Concluding Remarks
This papers presents a dynamic OLG growth model with heterogeneous labour,
endogenous unemployment and public sector corruption. The model does not
separate public o¢ cials and private individuals into two distinct groups. In-
stead, taking up bureaucratic appointment as a public servants is modelled
as an occupational choice, which then allows for the endogenous determina-
tion of all three variables of the proportion of public o¢ cials, the share of
corrupt o¢ cials among them, and the public investment e¢ ciency within a
dynamic system. Parameterised for Nigeria, the dynamics of endogenous cor-
ruption and unemployment, as well as their policy tradeo¤, are studied using
simulated policy experiments, ranging from public sector downsizing, social
intervention scheme, to an ambitious social reform programme preceding a
push in public infrastructure investment.
The dynamic relationship between unemployment and corruption in this
model depends critically on the specication of the concealment cost function.
While sensitivity analysis results seem to suggest that functional specication
does not signicantly a¤ect the results, the validity of the Shapiro-Stiglitz
type of uemployment-as-disciplinary mechanism does play a signicant role
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in shaping the unemployment-corruption nexus in this model. While there
are empirical studies documenting this relationship, such as Bouzid (2016),
the empirical validity remains limited. As such, for future studies, a rigorous
empirical examination based on a more parsimonious version of this model is
warranted. In terms of theoretical extension, the model can be extended to
account for other forms of public sector corruption, notably those associated
with tax collection. That will then enable more detailed examinations of the
tax implications, which is a feature largely simplied in this model.
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Table 1
Parameter Values: Benchmark Case
Parameter Description Value
Households
 Intergenerational discount rate 0:375
 Household savings rate 0:093
 Training productivity parameter 0:7
 Skills acquisition cost 0:229
% Time allocated to university 0:140
Private sector production
! FG elasticity wrt public-private capital ratio 0:173
 FG elasticity wrt unskilled workers 0:28
 FG elasticity wrt private capital 0:35
 FG elasticity wrt intermediate input 0:37
 Substitution parameter, intermediate goods 0:39
&m1 Blueprint elasticity wrt public services 0:100
Public sector
 Tax rate on total wages 0:058
I Share of spending on infrastructure 0:187
G Share of spending on public emoluments 0:337
S Share of spending on social security/benets 0:125
 Sub-quality public capital good purchase 0:7
 Elasticity parameter, concealment cost 0:5
p Probability of avoiding detection 0:8
max Upper bound, cost for inated reporting 1:296
 Ratio of capital goods demanded by government 0:305
Labour union
U Relative weight, unskilled workers 0:158
S Relative weight, skilled workers 0:158
{U Elasticity wrt unemployment, unskilled wage 0:108
{S Elasticity wrt unemployment, skilled wage 0:108
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Table 2
Initial Steady-State Values of Key Variables
Variable Description Value
U Share of unskilled workers in population 0.847
S Share of e¤ective skilled workers in population 0.141
SG Share of (e¤ective skilled) public o¢ cials 0.002
SY Share of e¤ective skilled workers in private sector 0.103
SL Skilled unemployment rate 0.036
UY Share of unskilled workers in private sector 0.741
UL Unskilled unemployment rate 0.106
SG Prob. of skilled workers employed in public sector 0.017
SY Prob. of skilled workers employed in private sector 0.728
SL Prob. of skilled workers getting unemployed 0.255
UY Prob. of unskilled workers getting employed 0.875
UL Prob. of unskilled workers getting unemployed 0.125
" Corruption rate 0.336
 Social security/benet rate, to per capita income 0.020
kG Public-private capital ratio 0.160
Y=KP Final output-private capital ratio 0.524
m Blueprint-private capital stock ratio 0.100
 Optimal threshold cost for inated reporting 1.246
't Public investment e¢ ciency 0.285
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Public Sector Downsizing:a Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state
Share of unskilled workers  0.847 0.0002 0.0019 0.0002 0.0010 0.0002 0.0014 0.0002 0.0021
Effective share of skilled workers 0.141 ‐0.0001 ‐0.0016 ‐0.0001 ‐0.0008 ‐0.0001 ‐0.0012 ‐0.0002 ‐0.0018
Effective share of public officials 0.002 ‐0.0002 ‐0.0002 ‐0.0002 ‐0.0002 ‐0.0002 ‐0.0002 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0003
Skilled unemployment rate 0.036 0.0001 ‐0.0003 0.0001 ‐0.0002 0.0001 ‐0.0003 0.0000 ‐0.0005
Unskilled unemployment rate 0.106 0.0002 0.0007 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0004 0.0001 0.0003
Headline unemployment rate 0.104 0.0002 0.0007 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0004 0.0001 0.0003
Share of corrupt officials 0.336 0.0619 0.0695 0.0619 0.0435 0.0550 0.0479 0.0453 0.0496
Social Security/Benefit rate 0.020 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 ‐0.0001 0.0000
Growth rate of final output 0.047 0.0000 ‐0.0015 0.0000 ‐0.0009 0.0000 ‐0.0010 0.0001 ‐0.0014
Public investment efficiency 0.285 ‐0.0067 ‐0.0062 ‐0.0067 ‐0.0154 ‐0.0059 ‐0.0039 ‐0.0040 ‐0.0030
Public Sector Downsizing, with Reallocation to
Social Security/Benefit Spending:b  Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state
Share of unskilled workers  0.847 ‐0.0001 0.0000 ‐0.0001 ‐0.0009 ‐0.0001 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0001 0.0002
Effective share of skilled workers 0.141 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 ‐0.0002
Effective share of public officials 0.002 ‐0.0002 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0002 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0002 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0003
Skilled unemployment rate 0.036 0.0011 0.0026 0.0011 0.0027 0.0011 0.0026 0.0010 0.0024
Unskilled unemployment rate 0.106 0.0025 0.0086 0.0025 0.0083 0.0025 0.0084 0.0024 0.0084
Headline unemployment rate 0.104 0.0025 0.0084 0.0025 0.0080 0.0025 0.0082 0.0024 0.0079
Share of corrupt officials 0.336 0.0588 0.0637 0.0595 0.0409 0.0534 0.0489 0.0435 0.0459
Social Security/Benefit rate 0.020 0.0015 0.0004 0.0015 0.0004 0.0015 0.0004 0.0015 0.0004
Growth rate of final output 0.047 ‐0.0016 ‐0.0023 ‐0.0016 ‐0.0009 ‐0.0016 ‐0.0020 ‐0.0015 ‐0.0022
Public investment efficiency 0.285 ‐0.0069 ‐0.0064 ‐0.0066 ‐0.0143 ‐0.0063 ‐0.0048 ‐0.0044 ‐0.0034
a/ A reduction in νG by 10 percent.
b/ A reduction in νG  by 10 percent, leading to an increase in νS by 10 percent.
Source: Authors' calculations.
Table 3   
Policy Experiment Results for (i) Public Sector Downsizing, and (ii) Public Sector Downsizing, but with reallocation to Social Security Spending
          Absolute Deviations from Baseline 
Baseline
          Absolute Deviations from Baseline 
Baseline
Benchmark Endogenous ψ Endogenous p δ = 1.0
Benchmark Endogenous ψ Endogenous p δ = 1.0
Raising Social Security/Benefit Spending:c Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state
Share of unskilled workers  0.847 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0019 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0019 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0018 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0019
Effective share of skilled workers 0.141 0.0002 0.0016 0.0002 0.0016 0.0002 0.0015 0.0002 0.0016
Effective share of public officials 0.002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Skilled unemployment rate 0.036 0.0010 0.0029 0.0010 0.0029 0.0010 0.0029 0.0010 0.0029
Unskilled unemployment rate 0.106 0.0023 0.0079 0.0023 0.0080 0.0023 0.0080 0.0023 0.0082
Headline unemployment rate 0.104 0.0023 0.0077 0.0023 0.0077 0.0023 0.0078 0.0022 0.0077
Share of corrupt officials 0.336 ‐0.0034 ‐0.0059 ‐0.0026 ‐0.0034 ‐0.0017 0.0009 ‐0.0019 ‐0.0037
Social Security/Benefit rate 0.020 0.0015 0.0004 0.0015 0.0004 0.0015 0.0004 0.0015 0.0004
Growth rate of final output 0.047 ‐0.0016 ‐0.0008 ‐0.0016 ‐0.0015 ‐0.0016 ‐0.0010 ‐0.0016 ‐0.0008
Public investment efficiency 0.285 ‐0.0002 ‐0.0002 0.0002 0.0008 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0009 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0004
Raising Social Security/Benefit Spending, 
plus a Cut in Training Cost:d Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state
Share of unskilled workers  0.847 ‐0.0030 ‐0.0084 ‐0.0030 ‐0.0075 ‐0.0030 ‐0.0073 ‐0.0030 ‐0.0079
Effective share of skilled workers 0.141 0.0026 0.0071 0.0026 0.0063 0.0026 0.0062 0.0026 0.0067
Effective share of public officials 0.002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Skilled unemployment rate 0.036 0.0033 0.0065 0.0033 0.0064 0.0033 0.0065 0.0033 0.0065
Unskilled unemployment rate 0.106 ‐0.0002 0.0044 ‐0.0002 0.0050 ‐0.0002 0.0052 ‐0.0001 0.0051
Headline unemployment rate 0.104 0.0002 0.0047 0.0002 0.0052 0.0003 0.0055 0.0003 0.0051
Share of corrupt officials 0.336 ‐0.0572 ‐0.0796 ‐0.0552 ‐0.0471 ‐0.0379 ‐0.0218 ‐0.0310 ‐0.0417
Social Security/Benefit rate 0.020 0.0016 0.0004 0.0016 0.0004 0.0016 0.0005 0.0016 0.0005
Growth rate of final output 0.047 ‐0.0029 0.0011 ‐0.0029 ‐0.0002 ‐0.0030 0.0000 ‐0.0030 0.0007
Public investment efficiency 0.285 0.0017 0.0038 0.0024 0.0137 ‐0.0008 ‐0.0026 ‐0.0012 ‐0.0002
c/ An increase in νS by 10 percent, financed by a 10 percent cut in νO.
d/ An increase in νS and μ each by 10 percent, financed by a 20 percent cut in νO.
Source: Authors' calculations.
Baseline
          Absolute Deviations from Baseline 
Benchmark Endogenous ψ Endogenous p δ = 1.0
Table 4   
Baseline
          Absolute Deviations from Baseline 
Benchmark Endogenous ψ Endogenous p δ = 1.0
Policy Experiment Results for (i) Raising Social Security/Benefit Spending, and (ii) Raising Social Security/Benefit Spending, plus a reduction in training cost, both 
financed by a reallocation from other non‐directly productive public spending 
Reduction in Unskiled Workers' Union Mark‐up:e Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state
Share of unskilled workers  0.847 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 0.0005 0.0001 0.0002
Effective share of skilled workers 0.141 ‐0.0001 ‐0.0001 ‐0.0001 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0001 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0001 ‐0.0002
Effective share of public officials 0.002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Skilled unemployment rate 0.036 0.0000 0.0011 0.0000 0.0011 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0011
Unskilled unemployment rate 0.106 ‐0.0007 ‐0.0034 ‐0.0007 ‐0.0032 ‐0.0007 ‐0.0031 ‐0.0007 ‐0.0033
Headline unemployment rate 0.104 ‐0.0006 ‐0.0029 ‐0.0006 ‐0.0028 ‐0.0006 ‐0.0026 ‐0.0006 ‐0.0027
Share of corrupt officials 0.336 ‐0.0024 ‐0.0283 ‐0.0028 ‐0.0173 ‐0.0016 ‐0.0046 ‐0.0011 ‐0.0132
Social Security/Benefit rate 0.020 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 0.0004
Growth rate of final output 0.047 0.0005 ‐0.0005 0.0005 ‐0.0012 0.0005 ‐0.0010 0.0005 ‐0.0006
Public investment efficiency 0.285 0.0005 0.0028 0.0004 0.0064 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0011
Ambitious Social Reform:
Social Intervention & Job Creation:f Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state
Share of unskilled workers  0.847 ‐0.0058 ‐0.0152 ‐0.0058 ‐0.0126 ‐0.0058 ‐0.0117 ‐0.0057 ‐0.0138
Effective share of skilled workers 0.141 0.0049 0.0127 0.0049 0.0106 0.0049 0.0099 0.0049 0.0117
Effective share of public officials 0.002 ‐0.0001 ‐0.0002 ‐0.0001 ‐0.0001 0.0000 ‐0.0001 0.0000 ‐0.0001
Skilled unemployment rate 0.036 0.0057 0.0124 0.0057 0.0121 0.0058 0.0121 0.0057 0.0122
Unskilled unemployment rate 0.106 ‐0.0042 ‐0.0064 ‐0.0042 ‐0.0047 ‐0.0041 ‐0.0039 ‐0.0040 ‐0.0048
Headline unemployment rate 0.104 ‐0.0032 ‐0.0044 ‐0.0032 ‐0.0028 ‐0.0031 ‐0.0020 ‐0.0030 ‐0.0030
Share of corrupt officials 0.336 ‐0.1270 ‐0.2593 ‐0.1242 ‐0.1373 ‐0.0806 ‐0.0546 ‐0.0678 ‐0.1283
Social Security/Benefit rate 0.020 0.0019 0.0012 0.0019 0.0012 0.0020 0.0012 0.0020 0.0012
Growth rate of final output 0.047 ‐0.0032 0.0025 ‐0.0032 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0033 ‐0.0011 ‐0.0033 0.0012
Public investment efficiency 0.285 ‐0.0206 ‐0.0089 ‐0.0197 0.0201 ‐0.0260 ‐0.0294 ‐0.0266 ‐0.0215
e/ A reduce of ξU by 10 percent, which translates to wage mark‐up going from 1.23 times to 1.20 times.
f/ An increase in νS by 10 percent, a training cost cut, µ, by 20 percent, and a reduction in ξ
U by 20 percent, which translates to 1.17 times of mark‐up.
Source: Authors' calculations.
Table 5   
Baseline
          Absolute Deviations from Baseline 
Benchmark Endogenous ψ Endogenous p δ = 1.0
Policy Experiment Results for (i) a Reduction in Unskilled Workers' Union Mark‐up, and (ii) Ambitious Social Reform Programme
Baseline
          Absolute Deviations from Baseline 
Benchmark Endogenous ψ Endogenous p δ = 1.0
An Increase in the Share of Public Investment:g Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state
Share of unskilled workers  0.847 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Effective share of skilled workers 0.141 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Effective share of public officials 0.002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Skilled unemployment rate 0.036 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Unskilled unemployment rate 0.106 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Headline unemployment rate 0.104 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Share of corrupt officials 0.336 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Social Security/Benefit rate 0.020 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Growth rate of final output 0.047 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Public investment efficiency 0.285 ‐0.0259 ‐0.0259 ‐0.0259 ‐0.0259 ‐0.0259 ‐0.0259 ‐0.0423 ‐0.0428
Ambitious Social Reform, coupled with An Increase 
in the Share of Public Investment:h
Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state Impact  Steady‐state
Share of unskilled workers  0.847 ‐0.0058 ‐0.0152 ‐0.0058 ‐0.0013 ‐0.0058 ‐0.0126 ‐0.0058 ‐0.0117 ‐0.0057 ‐0.0138
Effective share of skilled workers 0.141 0.0049 0.0127 0.0049 0.0011 0.0049 0.0106 0.0049 0.0099 0.0049 0.0117
Effective share of public officials 0.002 ‐0.0001 ‐0.0002 ‐0.0001 0.0000 ‐0.0001 ‐0.0001 0.0000 ‐0.0001 0.0000 ‐0.0001
Skilled unemployment rate 0.036 0.0057 0.0124 0.0057 0.0020 0.0057 0.0121 0.0058 0.0121 0.0057 0.0122
Unskilled unemployment rate 0.106 ‐0.0042 ‐0.0064 ‐0.0042 0.0006 ‐0.0042 ‐0.0047 ‐0.0041 ‐0.0039 ‐0.0040 ‐0.0048
Headline unemployment rate 0.104 ‐0.0032 ‐0.0044 ‐0.0032 0.0000 ‐0.0032 ‐0.0028 ‐0.0031 ‐0.0020 ‐0.0030 ‐0.0030
Share of corrupt officials 0.336 ‐0.1270 ‐0.2593 ‐0.1270 ‐0.3356 ‐0.1242 ‐0.1373 ‐0.0806 ‐0.0546 ‐0.0678 ‐0.1283
Social Security/Benefit rate 0.020 0.0019 0.0012 0.0019 0.0003 0.0019 0.0012 0.0020 0.0012 0.0020 0.0012
Growth rate of final output 0.047 ‐0.0032 0.0025 ‐0.0032 0.0031 ‐0.0032 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0033 ‐0.0011 ‐0.0033 0.0012
Public investment efficiency 0.285 ‐0.0206 ‐0.0089 ‐0.0206 0.7150 ‐0.0197 0.0201 ‐0.0260 ‐0.0294 ‐0.0266 ‐0.0215
g/ An increase in νI by 10 percent, financed by a 10 percent cut in νO.
h/ An increase in νS band vI by 10 percents, a training cost cut, µ, by 20 percent, and a reduction in ξ
U by 20 percent, which translates to 1.17 times of mark‐up.
Source: Authors' calculations.
Table 6
Policy Experiment Results for (i) An Increase in the Share of Public Investment, and (ii) Ambitious Social Reform, plus an Increase in Share of Public Investment, 
with Models with Endogenous Threshold for Corruption
Baseline
          Absolute Deviations from Baseline 
Benchmark Endogenous ψ Endogenous p δ = 1.0
δ = 1.0Baseline
Benchmark               (without 
switching)
Benchmark                  (with 
switching)
Endogenous ψ Endogenous p
          Absolute Deviations from Baseline 
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Figure 1
Public Sector Downsizing 
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
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Figure 2
An Increase in the  Share of Social Security / Benefit Spending 
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
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Figure 3
Reduction in Unskiled Workers' Union Wage Mark-up 
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
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Figure 4
Ambitious Social Reform, coupled with an Increase in Share of Public Investment 
(Absolute deviations from baseline)
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